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There are no international rules of competition. With less state interferen-
ce, airlines are increasingly seeking unfair advantages through market-distorting 
business practices. Hence, fair competition is nowadays becoming a hot, cruci-
al topic. The increasing commercial influence of non-European carriers seems to 
have caused serious concerns in the European Union. The European Commission 
sanctions infringement of the rules on state aid by EU airlines regardless whether 
injury actually occurred. There is a presumption that state aid as such distorts 
the internal market. Consequently, as a matter of principle, state aid – especi-
ally on a massive, disruptive scale – is incompatible with fair competition when 
it comes to third country airlines operating in the EU market. In addition to 
government support, there are other factors distorting fair competition and the 
level playing field in the aviation industry, meaning an urgent solution to the 
problem is needed. An instrument more appropriate and effective than Regulation 
(EC) 868/2004 needs to be developed to safeguard fair and open competition 
in the EU’s external aviation relations. Ultimately, as the aviation industry 
is becoming increasingly global, we should explore the possibility of creating an 
international, truly global airline regulatory policy covering competition between 
airlines and an institution which would regulate global airline competition and 
create a level playing field for all.
Keywords: fair competition, ‘Middle-Eastern 3’, subsidies, unfair advantage, 
Regulation (EC) 868/2004
*  Dario Klasić, LL. M., Attorney-at-law; Doctoral Candidate, Institut für Luft- und 
Weltraumrecht, Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität zu Köln, Albertus-
Magnus-Platz, Cologne, Germany; dario.klasic@kr.ht.hr
D. Klasić: Flying on the Edge of Legalities - Safeguarding Fair Competition in European...250
I. INTRODUCTION
The airline sector has undergone a significant evolution in the last decades. 
The focal point of this evolution is the widespread shift from regulation to li-
beralization and de-regulation. This shift has transformed the structure of the 
airline sector and has, in many ways, affected its competitive intensity. With 
less state interference, airlines are increasingly seeking unfair advantages thro-
ugh market-distorting business practices; new conflicts are arising regularly 
and the need for a level playing field is becoming more apparent as many air-
lines are struggling for their economic survival or going bankrupt, all pointing 
to the need for an urgent solution to the problem.
In the European Union aviation plays a fundamental role, both for the 
citizens and the economy in general. By supporting more than 11 million jobs 
and contributing more than 860 billion EUR to the European GDP1, it makes 
a vital contribution to economic growth, employment, tourism, people-to-peo-
ple contacts as well as the regional and social cohesion of the European Union. 
However, the aviation industry in Europe is increasingly running into turbu-
lence. One after another, we are witnessing European airlines going bankrupt 
or being bought up. Among the reasons for this decline are a worsening politi-
cal environment and aggressive growth among non-European airlines since the 
late 1990s. Hubs in Asia and the Persian Gulf want to usurp Europe’s role as 
a major aviation center, consequently placing tens of thousands of jobs at risk.
Fair competition is increasingly becoming a hot, crucial topic. While it is 
vital to ensure a business climate that enables EU carriers to compete interna-
tionally, the EU’s external aviation policy must also stress the importance of 
fair and open competition. When, for example, subsidies, unfair practices, in-
consistent application of regulatory frameworks and a lack of transparency in 
financial reporting of companies are used to distort the market, it is legitimate 
to defend the industry against unfair competition.
The increasing commercial influence of non-European carriers (especially 
the ones from the Middle East) seems to have caused serious concerns in the 
European Union about the impact on more established carriers and their bu-
1 “Aviation: Benefits Beyond Borders”, Report prepared by Oxford Economics for 
ATAG, April 2014, p. 38. It should be noted that these figures include considerable 
indirect and induced effects which multiply the impact of aviation on the economy. 
The whole report available at URL visited September 1st 2015: http://aviationbene-
fits.org/media/26786/ATAG__AviationBenefits2014_FULL_LowRes.pdf.
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siness, and has given rise to efforts to strengthen regulation in the pursuit of a 
level playing field.2 
Over the past months, we have witnessed serious allegations over Qatar 
Airways, Etihad Airways and Emirates Airline, three large airlines which are 
owned by the respective governments of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, 
for having received large subsidies since the year 2004. 
The subsidies certainly make it hard for non-subsidized airlines to compete 
and also violate the spirit of fair air service agreements, distort the internatio-
nal aviation market and simply give those airlines unfair advantage. Consequ-
ently, it is important that competition, both within the European Union and 
externally, should not be distorted by unfair practices.
Within the European Union, the European Commission has opened a series 
of in-depth investigations into cases of potential state aid to airlines in several 
European Union member states. The concern is that airlines receiving such aid 
obtain an undue economic advantage that competitors do not enjoy, thereby 
distorting competition within the European Union single aviation market.
On 20 February 2014, the European Commission adopted new guidelines 
on state aid to airports and airlines (Aviation Guidelines), which came into 
force after their publication on 04 April 2014.3
Those new guidelines contain a remarkable amount of criteria for assessing 
the presence of State aid within the meaning of Article 107 (1) of the EU Tre-
aty (paragraphs 26 to 66) and for the next few years they shall constitute the 
benchmark for financial assistance to airlines and airports.4  
At the same time, non-EU carriers have reinforced their global position. 
For example, the fastest regional traffic growth in the world is happening in 
the Middle East, where by 2030 the region’s airlines will represent 11% of 
the world’s traffic, up from 7% in 2010.5 The global competitive pattern has 
changed significantly with the rise of the Gulf carriers providing so-called 6th 
2 Wassenbergh, H., The International Airline Industry: The Straightjacket of Competition 
Law, Annals of Air and Space Law, Vol. XXIX, 2004, pp. 185 – 199.
3 OJ C 99, 04/04/2014, p. 3. In addition, the Commission published MEMO/14/121 
on FAQs and a policy brief on the guidelines, retrieved February 1st, 2015 from 
URL: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2014/002_en.pdf.
4 Giesberts, L., State Aid to Airports and Airlines, The new Aviation Guidelines of the Euro-
pean Commission, Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht (German Journal of Air 
and Space Law), Vol. 64, No. 2, 2015, pp. 258 – 259.
5 European Commission Press Release, Transport: New horizons for EU aviation, Brusse-
ls, September 26, 2012, retrieved February 1st, 2015 from URL: http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-12-1027_en.htm.
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freedom services (connecting markets through inter-continental routes via the-
ir hubs), increasing their market shares, positioning themselves aggressively for 
the future with massive new investments in aircraft and airports and taking 
advantage of a worldwide network of highly liberal bilateral air services agree-
ments. With further importance, governments in the Gulf region have inve-
sted heavily in aviation infrastructure, de facto turning aviation into a strategic 
instrument to promote the global role of the region.
II. PRINCIPLES OF FAIR AIRLINE COMPETITION
There are no international rules of competition. Most airlines are go-
vernment-owned and the airline sector is one of the few industries (generally) 
not covered by the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS). Instead, bilateral air transport agreements go-
vern access to thousands of markets worldwide and ensure a balance of in-
terests as well as comparable market conditions. That is precisely why such 
agreements are enormously important to the mostly private European carriers 
in competition with the (government-owned) airlines from third countries. 
As a matter of principle, state aid – especially on a massive, disruptive scale 
– is incompatible with fair competition. In fact, it erodes competition and re-
duces market access. In the European Union, according to the EU Treaty (i.e. 
the European “constitution”), state aid is incompatible with the principles of 
a liberalized internal market in any industry, i.e. from the cement market to 
telecommunication, energy and aviation. State aid is only allowed if it meets 
one of the exemptions set out in the EU Treaty (Article 107). 
A crucial criterion is the so called “private investor test”. European Union 
law does not prohibit public entities to participate in the internal market, but 
it expects that such government entities behave like a private investor and be 
fully transparent with respect to their support to private companies. 
The European Commission sanctions infringement of the rules on state aid 
regardless of whether injury actually occurs. There is a presumption that state 
aid as such distorts the market. Consequently, affected companies are not 
obliged to demonstrate injury.
In the internal market, the European Commission has applied and enforced 
these rules in the aviation sector. The European Commission has grounded Eu-
ropean Union airlines and forced airports6 into bankruptcy requiring them to 
6 Malev, the Hungarian national airline, went bankrupt and ceased operations in 
February 2012. Olympic Airways also ceased operations after it was ordered to 
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repay unlawful state aid without requiring competitors to demonstrate injury 
caused by such state aid. The same principles should apply to state aid granted 
by governments of third countries. 
With no doubt, mature European airlines are ready to compete with any 
airline from any other part of the world, however, competition must be based 
on fair and equal opportunities with the same rules applying to all parties. If 
there is evidence that governments finance airlines doing business in the Euro-
pean Union or if governments directly or indirectly invest in European airlines 
in order to deviate traffic to their hubs, such behavior should be subject to full 
transparency and should be sanctioned in case of infringement of applicable 
laws. 
a. EUROPE vs. THE GULF
In my opinion the current European bilateral arrangements with the Gulf 
states are generous. For instance, from the European perspective Germany has 
very liberal air transport agreements with the United Arab Emirates. The mar-
ket is largely open: carriers like Emirates Airline can select from among three 
German airports and expand capacities and frequencies at will. Hamburg was 
additionally approved as a fourth destination point by the German side. In 
addition, Emirates Airline also served a route between Germany and the Uni-
ted States between 2006 and 2008. The Gulf airlines now have more than 100 
weekly flights versus less than 20 weekly flights allotted to German carriers. By 
comparison, three airline companies from the world’s most populous nations 
– China and India – fly 40 weekly frequencies to Germany. 
Due to the relatively small market in the Gulf region, European airlines 
offer few flights to Doha, Dubai or Abu Dhabi. For example, European Union 
airlines fly no more than twice a day to those destinations. At the same time, 
the Gulf state airlines now already serve the same routes with up to ten times 
as many flights daily. They collect passengers in Europe with travel destinati-
ons in India or Southeast Asia and direct the connecting traffic to their own 
hubs, taking jobs with them. One long-haul aircraft operated by a German 
airline creates approx. 400 jobs7 – we therefore need to be careful about how 
repay state aid. Cyprus Airways and Estonian Air could be mentioned as the latest 
tragic EU examples from 2015.
7 Lufthansa Policy Brief 2/2013, May 2013, p. 2, retrieved April 10th, 2015 from URL: 
https://www.lufthansagroup.com/fileadmin/downloads/en/policy-brief/02_2013/
LH-PolicyBrief-May-2013.pdf.
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we handle traffic rights. However, instead of being able to expand their ope-
rations to Asia and Africa, the European airlines have reduced their network 
to South East Asia and Africa over the past years, letting the Middle-Eastern 
3 take over.8
b. THE GULF vs. EUROPE
It may be useful at this point to say a few words about the carriers from the 
Middle East which are enthusiastically expanding their fleets and operating 
hugely expanded routes throughout the world – certainly far more than anyo-
ne involved in international aviation would have thought possible a decade 
ago.
The unprecedented growth of the three Gulf carriers is a challenge global 
aviation has not experienced in its long history. Putting capacity in the mar-
kets at prices that other airlines cannot reasonably match, the aviation policy 
of the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are true game changers. This has led 
to a radical shift of market shares and connectivity from Europe to the Gulf.
The Persian Gulf governments have declared air transport a strategic sector 
and are providing them with generous support. The emirate of Dubai has a 
“consensus based partnership” between the government and the airline Emi-
rates. Other Gulf state carriers, such as Etihad and Qatar Airways, also enjoy 
tailor-made regulatory conditions.
Airlines from the Gulf region are increasing their presence not only in Eu-
rope, but worldwide in many countries, increasingly securing business for their 
8 Lufthansa (list includes points operated by LH’s subsidiaries) has (partially) sto-
pped service to the following destinations: Calcutta, Hyderabad, Manila, Karac-
hi, Lahore, Sydney, Ho Chi Minh-City, Sanaa, Tashkent, Katmandu, Denpasar/
Bali, Pusan, Male/Maldives, Mahe/Seychelles, Colombo, Nairobi, Khartoum, Ha-
rare, Mauritius, Entebbe, and Lusaka. Austrian Airlines has given up the following 
destinations: Denpasar, Melbourne, Sydney, Shanghai, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, 
Colombo, Kathmandu, Bombay, Rangoon, Phuket, Jeddah, Riyadh, Beirut, Da-
mascus, Tripoli, Baghdad, Nairobi, Johannesburg, and Harare. Swiss International 
Air Lines with its subsidiary Edelweiss Air has given up the following destinati-
ons: Ho-Chi-Minh-City, Manila, Jakarta, Colombo, Karachi, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, 
Jeddah, Riyadh, Teheran, Beirut, Damascus, Baku, Yaoundé, Lagos, Accra, Mala-
bo, Harare, Douala, Libreville, Tripoli, Bengasi, Tunis, Casablanca, Kilimanjaro, 
Mombasa, Agadir, Djerba, Monastir, Luxor, Marrakesh, Marsa Alam, Mauritius. 
Air France has stopped flights to: Jeddah, Karachi, Khartoum, Kuwait, Manila, 
Muscat, Sana’a, Sydney, Teheran, Abu Dhabi, Arusha, Bahrain, Chennai, Damas-
cus, Dar Es Salaam, Denpasar, Doha, and Harare etc. Most of those destinations 
are now increasingly served by the Middle-Eastern 3.
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fast-growing aircraft fleets. The problem is, market opportunities and compe-
titive conditions for airlines from the Middle East and countries in the Euro-
pean Union have meanwhile become utterly imbalanced.9 
Gulf carriers offer tickets in all classes at relatively low prices, but intere-
stingly enough, they also seem to be waging a price war among themselves in 
order to fill their planes (sometimes oversized for the markets they serve) in 
order to maintain a market share or in some cases not to be forced out of the 
market completely.
In this context, it should be noted that most bilateral air service agree-
ments contain provisions that the tariffs applied by airlines should reflect 
costs. However, it is a question of political willpower to apply and enforce 
such provisions.
Only fair agreements on traffic rights can remedy the situation.
III. THE WHITE PAPER ALLEGATIONS
In early 2015, three US airlines (Delta, American, and United Airlines) 
have published a white paper in which they claim that Emirates Airline, Qatar 
Airways and Etihad were receiving billions of dollars in subsidies. The paper 
also contends that Middle-Eastern airlines were competing unfairly under the 
terms of the open skies agreement between the United States and the United 
Arab Emirates. The serious allegations outline that Gulf carriers generate their 
growth by taking substantial portions from other market participants with 
no evidence that they actually meaningfully stimulate market growth. Taking 
into account the number of aircraft ordered by the Gulf carriers, the additional 
capacity they bring into the market will continue to exceed the market growth 
by far for years to come.
The governments of Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai have allegedly granted 
over $40 billion in subsidies10 and other unfair benefits to their state-owned 
carriers in order to stimulate their economies by promoting the flow of inter-
national passenger traffic through their Gulf mega-hubs. 
9 The expansion of the Gulf carriers has resulted in a massive shift in traffic flows. 
Approximately 80 per cent of the passengers occupying seats in an aircraft of the 
Gulf carriers are flying beyond the Gulf hubs to destinations in Asia and Africa.
10 Carrey, B., U.S. Airlines Allege Unfair Competition From Gulf Carriers, AIN Online, 
retrieved May 5th, 2015 from URL: http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news.com/
air-transport/2015-03-06/ us-airlines-allege-unfair-competition-gulf-carriers.
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The study undertaken by the three US carriers has produced evidence that 
the Gulf carriers’ rapid expansion is attributable in great measure to the go-
vernmental aviation policy and not the carriers’ private initiatives in line with 
the principles of a liberalized market. Based on the study, state-owned Qatar 
Airways, Etihad Airways and Emirates Airline are now using this huge, artifici-
al cost advantage to exploit the liberal access to the European, and even more 
dangerously, open access they have to the US market.
Shortly after the publication of the study, the Middle-Eastern 3 disputed 
the claim that they are subsidized. At a later stage they argued that EU and US 
carriers have equally been granted substantial subsidies from the government.
To remedy the situation, the European authorities would need to apply the 
same principles to aviation as in other fields of international trade. Foreign 
companies doing business in Europe need to adhere to the same principles 
which apply to European companies doing business in Europe. 
IV. OTHER DISTORTING FACTORS
In addition to government support, there are other factors distorting fair 
competition, which include: 
- Environmental (cost of carbon emissions): EU rules seldom apply to 
non-EU competitors. Carriers like Emirates Airline or Qatar Airways 
save millions and can thus offer lower prices for detour routes to Asia 
that do more harm to the environment – just the opposite of what the 
European Union wants to achieve. 
- Passenger rights provisions and consumer protection: compensation 
payments for cancellations are mandatory in Europe – even if the airli-
nes are not at all at fault. Such examples rarely exist in other sectors and 
regions of the world. The European Commission has proposed a number 
of revisions to the Regulation (EC) 261/2004, which shall further oblige 
EU airlines.
- Export credits: government guarantees with extremely low interest rates 
for the purchase of aircraft gained major importance in 2009. This has 
resulted in massive distortions of competition because only airlines from 
non-producer countries may apply for guarantees. Gulf carriers benefit, 
while EU airlines from producer countries are left out of the deal.11 
11 E.g. Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) is the official export 
credit agency of the United States federal government. Operating as a government 
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- Production costs: Europe-based airlines are at a competitive disadvan-
tage internationally if their production costs are higher than those of 
other airlines. EU carriers are certainly handicapped by higher costs re-
sulting from congested airports and airspace in Europe, as well as higher 
air traffic management and airport charges. 
a. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Labor costs related to high labor standards and well developed social pro-
tection systems are higher in the European Union than in most other world 
regions.
There is no doubt that, like flags of convenience in maritime, Middle-Ea-
stern carriers are hiring most of their staff from third countries – if for no other 
reason, then because there are simply not enough trained personnel in the in-
dividual Middle-Eastern countries to meet the needs of their growing airlines. 
Middle-Eastern airlines are paying pilot wages that are similar or higher 
than those that are paid by other Western or EU airlines – as there is a gene-
ral shortage of experienced pilots in today’s international aviation and, if an 
airline wishes to operate long haul aircraft, it must pay Western equivalent 
wages to its pilots. On the other hand, when it comes to flight attendants and 
ground personnel, which represent the majority of the airline’s workforce, the 
financial facts may not be the same.
According to a last year’s ruling by the International Labor Organization 
from June 2015, Qatar Airways has been discriminating against its female em-
ployees, in breach of international labor laws. The airline’s policy of reserving 
the right to terminate the employment of pregnant women and its banning 
of female employees from being allowed to be picked up or dropped off at 
the company premises by an unrelated male amounts to sexual discrimina-
tion. The ILO also expressed concerns about the contractual obligation for 
employees to declare their marital status and the fact that some are employed 
on a “single status” basis, despite removing the clause that required employees 
to obtain prior permission from the company to get married.
Based on the submitted White Paper, Qatar Airways, Etihad and Emirates 
Airline have cumulatively saved more than 3 billion USD thanks to union 
corporation, the bank finances and insures foreign purchases of United States go-
ods for customers unable or unwilling to accept credit risk. Congressional authori-
zation for the bank lapsed as of July 1, 2015. As a result, the bank cannot engage 
in new business, but it continues to manage its existing loan portfolio.
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bans and employment conditions which have resulted in below-market labor 
costs. 
Employment conditions on carriers from countries that do not have an 
established history of maintaining first-rate conditions of employment should 
be a subject deserving of serious and continuing public examination.12 Never-
theless, it is hard to imagine that loose labor laws could be defined as subsidies.
The above mentioned issues could be addressed in negotiations with par-
tner countries aiming to create a level playing field, e.g. by respecting interna-
tional labor and environmental standards.
b. MARKET ACCESS, FINDING THE LAST LOOPHOLES
Traffic rights – also called freedoms of the air – are the backbone of inter-
national air transport. They are negotiated by states/countries. Traffic rights 
encompass transit and transport agreements for air travel between states and 
enable fair and equal market access. 
In light of the aggressive push by the Gulf state airlines to expand, these 
rights are of decisive importance (airlines can only provide air service between 
two countries if the corresponding traffic rights have been agreed). 
The UN International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) distinguis-
hes among eight different traffic rights: the first two freedoms govern transit 
traffic. These were laid out in the Chicago Convention in 1944. The remai-
ning rights govern commercial freedoms and are mostly concluded bilaterally 
between contracting parties.
c. FIFTH FREEDOM CONTROVERSIES
The freedoms of the air are a key factor in determining the international 
commercial aviation route network. Entitlement to operate international air 
services under these freedoms becomes valid only after national authorities 
have granted their consent, either through multilateral and bilateral treaties 
(air services agreements), or through ad hoc authorizations.
Fifth freedom traffic has always been especially controversial and sought 
after. In European history fifth freedom traffic rights have sparingly been given 
on a small number of occasions and sometimes carefully traded for increased 
frequencies. Airlines granted fifth freedom traffic rights included Air New Ze-
aland, Qantas, Air India and Kuwait Airways at London Heathrow (LHR), 
12 Mendelsohn, A., Flags of Convenience: Maritime and Aviation, The Aviation & Space 
Journal, Vol. XIII, No. 1, January - March 2014, , pp. 4 – 5.
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Singapore Airlines at Frankfurt International (FRA), Jet Airways at Brussels 
(BRU), Emirates Airline at Hamburg International (HAM), Eva Air and Ma-
laysia Airlines at Vienna (VIE), Air China and LAN Chile at Madrid (MAD), 
China Airlines at Rome (FCO). Such rights were established by the Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 and are defined by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as “the right or privilege, in 
respect of scheduled international air services, granted by one State to another 
State to put down and to take on, in the territory of the first State, traffic co-
ming from or destined to a third State”.
Recently we have witnessed Italian carriers challenging the validity of such 
authorizations before the Italian courts. Controversially enough, these cases 
involved Emirates Airline and Qatar Airways.
In March 2013, ENAC, the Italian civil aviation authority, authorized 
Emirates Airline to land at Milan Malpensa (MXP) and board passengers tra-
velling on to the United States.13 However, at the end of 2013, Alitalia Cai 
S.p.A. brought an action against ENAC and the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Transport, challenging the legitimacy of the authorization in light of internati-
onal and European legislation. As a result, the administrative court of first in-
stance declared the given authorization null and void in April 2014. An appeal 
against this decision was filed by Emirates before the Council of State, along 
with a request for a precautionary suspension of the first instance judgment. In 
May 2014, the Council of State granted the requested suspension, stating that 
the decision had an impact on public interest and consumers.
As there are no provisions which would allow such fifth freedom traffic in 
the bilateral agreement dating back to 1992, the controversial authorization 
was given based on the so-called “Sblocca Italia” act14, which introduced urgent 
13 Masutti, A.; Laconi, A., Emirates Granted “Fifth Freedom Rights” For Milan - New York 
Flights: A New Target On EU - U.S. Routes, Mondaq, May 21, 2013, retrieved May 
15th, 2015 from: http://www.mondaq.com/x/240244/Aviation/Emirates+Granted+
Fifth+Freedom+Rights+For+MilanNew+York+Flights+A+New+Target+On+
EU+US+Routes.
14 Act of 11th November 2014, n. 164, Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-
legge 12 settembre 2014, n. 133, recante misure urgenti per l’apertura dei cantieri, la rea-
lizzazione delle opere pubbliche, la digitalizzazione del Paese, la semplificazione burocratica, 
l’emergenza del dissesto idrogeologico e per la ripresa delle attivita produttive (Conversion 
into Act, with Amendments, of the Decree Law of 12th September 2014, n. 133, 
regarding Urgent Measures for the Opening of Construction Sites, the Performance 
of Public Works, the Computerization of the Country, the Simplification of Bu-
reaucracy, the Emergency of the Hydrogeological Imbalance and the Recovery of 
Production Activities).
D. Klasić: Flying on the Edge of Legalities - Safeguarding Fair Competition in European...260
measures to kick-start the Italian economy, and which was promulgated in 
November 2014. Under the title “Urgent Measures for the Improvement of Airport 
Functionality” a sub-article is devoted to regulating the regime on authorizing 
foreign airlines to operate fifth freedom flights.
An analogous controversy was developing in respect to authorization which 
was granted to Qatar Airways in the spring of 2013 regarding the route Chica-
go (ORD) – Milan Malpensa (MXP) – Doha (DOH). 
In 2014, Cargolux Italia S.p.A. launched proceedings against ENAC clai-
ming that such authorization had been illegitimately granted. The decision of 
the administrative court that revoked the authorization was likewise appealed 
before the Council of State, and the request for a precautionary suspension of 
the first instance judgment was awarded.3 
In particular, Cargolux asked the Court to suspend the ENAC authorizati-
on in question. In that respect, it is noteworthy that in order to perform those 
services in Italy, ENAC’s authorization is necessary for international airlines 
as Article 6 of the Chicago Convention states that all international air services, 
in order to operate in a foreign state, must be given authorization from that 
state (“No scheduled international air service may be operated over or into 
the territory of a contracting State, except with the special permission or other 
authorization of that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permi-
ssion or authorization”). 
The Court of first instance ruled in favor of the petitioner, suspending 
ENAC’s authorization preventing Qatar Airways from further operations on 
the Milano Malpensa (MXP) – Chicago (ORD) route.
Qatar Airways had appealed against such decision before the Council of 
State (Consiglio di Stato) and asked for a precautionary measure which would 
revoke the suspension ordered by the Court of first instance. 
Finally, the Council of State issued a decree on the precautionary request; 
the Council of State found in favor of the appellant. Therefore, the suspensi-
on of ENAC’s authorization by TAR - Lazio was revoked and Qatar Airways 
was again allowed to operate at Milan-Malpensa (MXP) airport. The decision 
of the Council of State took into account the public interest at stake in the 
matter.
Cargolux Italia S.p.A. is still challenging the last Council of State decree 
before the Supreme Court of Italy and the final result is to be seen. However, 
in the meantime, the agreement reached by Alitalia Cai and Etihad, the natio-
nal carrier of the United Arab Emirates, for the acquisition of 49% of Alitalia’s 
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shares in August 2014 came into effect on 1 January 2015 and, interestingly 
enough, Alitalia has decided not to continue with the case before the Supreme 
Court.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the United Arab Emirates’ national 
airline, Etihad, has recently been active in penetrating the European market 
and finding access loopholes by using a different approach: it acquired equity 
in ailing European carriers, namely Air Berlin, Alitalia, Air Serbia15 and Darwin 
Airline, using them to expand its network and market reach.16 
This is possibly against normal practices as required by an open market 
economy according to which a financially weak airline would have to be sub-
stantially restructured and downsized. In the case of Etihad, the contrary has 
happened – Etihad has injected vast amounts of money in these ailing Euro-
pean airlines in order to expand the feeder system to their Abu Dhabi-based 
network. 
Furthermore, Etihad has not disclosed how it is financing its investments, 
which have in 2015 reached over 1.5 billion EUR – an extraordinary amount 
of capital for a company without any commercially earned profit.
Importantly, under bilateral air services agreements, carriers may have to be 
substantially owned and effectively controlled by the designating states and/
or its nationals.
In the Etihad cases, the minority stake rule has been kept, but the manage-
rial and board positions have been carefully allocated so that the nationality 
clauses embodied in bilateral air services agreements do not come at stake. 
However, it looks that the ownership and nationality are becoming increasin-
gly blurred.17
15 While Serbia is not an EU member state, as a candidate country it must adhere to 
the Union’s pre-accession policies and guidelines. Following Etihad’s takeover of Jat 
Airways, the EC requested Serbia to clarify the airline’s new ownership structure. 
While a carrier from outside Europe can hold a minority stake in an EU airline or a 
country aspiring to join the block, it must prove that the effective control is still in 
the hands of the majority shareholder.
16 The European Commission (EC) launched an investigation into Etihad’s invest-
ments in European airlines in April last year as part of a wider examination into 
whether foreign ownership of European carriers complies with EU airline licensing 
rules. The Commission has doubts whether Etihad’s investments are in line with 
European Union rules on ownership and effective control of EU airlines.
17 Dempsy, P.S., The Future of International Air Law in the 21st Century, Zeitschrift 
für Luft- und Weltraumrecht (German Journal of Air and Space Law), Vol. 64, No. 2, 
2015, p. 228. 
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A similar case might be rising up in Hungary. Being left without a national 
air carrier, the Hungarian government is exploring possible partnership with 
Emirates and granting fifth freedom permissions to gain better access to cu-
rrently unserved markets.
The above mentioned cases certainly show that we still tend to be led by 
national interests and rely on ad hoc initiatives for negotiations based on indi-
vidual authorizations, instead of having a strong common external aviation po-
licy. In doing so, we must always remember that we are looking to strengthen 
the competitiveness of the entire value chain of the European aviation, and all 
elements within it, not only the interest of the end-consumer.
V. A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
We cannot deny that Middle-Eastern carriers have increased consumer 
choice, filled a gap in the market by taking travelers to numerous destinations 
not served by others, and helped contribute to the EU and US economy, trade 
and tourism. Importantly, Middle-Eastern carriers also provide a much-needed 
competitive alternative to legacy carriers, airline alliances and fares which are 
sometimes kept artificially high.
Furthermore, many legacy carriers have far too often played safe with long-
established routes, and ignored new and growing markets such as the Indian 
subcontinent and Africa.
Regulators and decision-makers in the aviation sphere need to consider 
whether artificially protecting legacy carriers is worthwhile if that eventually 
leads to higher prices, limited choice, poor service and unrealized economic 
activity. Erecting barriers certainly does not create value. More competition, 
more connectivity and more choice for consumers and businesses does.
a. WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM OUR COMPETITORS?
A key component of Dubai’s economic and trade policy is its Open Skies 
policy. Dubai is one of the true pioneers of aviation liberalization having adop-
ted an open skies policy as one of the cornerstones of its economy ever since 
late Sheikh Saeed bin Maktoum Al Maktoum signed the Dubai Commercial 
Air Agreement with Her Majesty’s Government in July 1937, long before Emi-
rates was established in 1985. 
The Agreement triggered the Open Skies policy of Dubai. It gave the Bri-
tish Government landing permission en route to India and elsewhere and it 
was quickly evident that it helped strengthen Dubai’s position as an important 
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trading outpost in the Gulf. In the 1950s, HH Sheikh Saeed bin Maktoum Al 
Maktoum, the ruler of Dubai at the time, decreed a policy of open seas, open 
skies and open trade, in part to help eliminate the dependence on oil resour-
ces. This was one of the first contributions to building the business-friendly 
Dubai of today which was subsequently complemented by the creation of free 
zones and other business investment-friendly incentives. Today oil revenue 
constitutes a mere 1.8% of Dubai’s GDP, whereas aviation related activities 
and tourism make up approximately 30%.18
Middle-Eastern carriers further benefit from smart, forward-looking go-
vernmental strategies to stimulate passenger growth by setting low airport fees, 
low corporate taxes and minimal passenger-related fees and taxes which drives 
significant economic benefit to the host countries.
Next to providing connectivity and direct employment, the large-scale eco-
nomic activity through purchases of goods and services has a multiplier effect 
which creates indirect and induced employment. The report ‘Emirates’ Impact 
in Europe’ by Frontier Economics19 quantifies Emirates’ operational impact in 
Europe and provides detailed coverage of these impacts in all of the European 
Union member states that Emirates operates to. 
The research estimates that Emirates’ direct, indirect and induced impact 
from its operations in the European Union supports 85,100 jobs across the 
member countries, equivalent to €6.8 billion of GDP.
VI. HIGH TIME FOR AN UPDATE?
a. REGULATION (EC) 868/2004
On the external side, Regulation (EC) 868/200420 was intended to protect 
against subsidization21 and unfair pricing practices causing injury to European 
18 Botros, M., History of Dubai Civil Aviation Celebrated, Gulf News, December 08, 
2014, p. 17, retrieved April 1st, 2015 from: http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/go-
vernment/history-of-dubai-civil-aviation-celebrated-1.1423918
19 Retrieved June 18th, 2015 from: http://content.emirates.com/downloads/ek/pdfs/
int_gov_affairs/Emirates_Economic_Impact_in_Europe.pdf
20 Regulation (EC) N° 868/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
April 2004 – Official Journal, April 30, 2004, L 162/1.
21 According to the Regulation, a subsidy exists when a government, regional body or 
other public organization makes a financial contribution that confers a benefit. It 
may take a form of: grants, loans or equity infusion, potential direct transfer of 
funds or the assumption of liabilities; revenue that is otherwise due but which is 
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Union carriers in the supply of air services from non-EU countries. However, 
strong calls have been made for developing more effective EU instruments 
in the aviation sector to protect European interests against unfair practices. 
Regulation (EC) 868/2004 has never been used and the industry argues that 
the Regulation is not practicable as it has been modelled on tools used in 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy for goods and is not properly adapted to the 
specificities of the aviation services sector. A more appropriate and effective 
instrument would need to be developed to safeguard fair and open competiti-
on in the EU’s external aviation relations.
b. WHAT IS THE RELEVANCE? 
The loss of market share sooner or later translates into the elimination of 
flights and ultimately to the reduction of the fleet, thus reducing consumer 
choice and jobs.
It is important to see that airlines employ an overwhelming majority of 
their employees at their home hubs. For example, some 70,000 Lufthansa 
employees work directly in Germany, Air France employs 60,000 people in 
France, British Airways 40,000 in the United Kingdom, etc. Without traffic 
flows, not only these jobs and their added value would be threatened over the 
long term, but also tens of thousands of jobs at suppliers and in the logistics 
industry. 
Europe is in jeopardy of losing a leading position in air transport that has 
been built up over decades. E.g. Airbus is building production sites in Asia to 
be closer to important customers. If European airlines lose further ground, this 
trend will only intensify.
Europe’s network airlines offer optimal flight connections even to far-flung 
regions; however, Europe needs to preserve the diversity of connections. Alter-
natively, it might happen in the future that transiting in the Middle East will 
be the only option for eastward bound travels.
VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
To remedy the current situation, the European Union has recognized the 
need for developing a more effective instrument to safeguard safe competition 
in EU external aviation relations. The Council, in consultations with Member 
forgone or not collected; the supply of goods or services other than general infra-
structure, or their purchase by a public body…
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States and the industry has agreed with the European Commission to analyze 
possible options. In that sense, there are ongoing considerations which include 
amendments to the current Regulation (EC) 868/2004. Alternatively, adop-
ting a new, improved Regulation which would completely replace the current 
Regulation (EC) 868/2004 is seen as a valuable option. 
Another solution to the problem could be a regulatory arrangement in the 
form of a model clause included in bilateral air services agreements, which sta-
tes would use as a means to identify, prevent and eliminate anti-competitive 
abuse, under enforceable sanctions (e.g. suspension or restriction on the use of 
traffic rights available under air transport agreements).
Ultimately, as the aviation industry is becoming increasingly global, we 
should explore the possibility of creating an international, truly global airline 
regulatory policy covering competition between airlines, and an institution 
which would regulate global airline competition and create a level playing field 
for all.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the grand aviation politics, the playing field is seldom level to begin 
with. Nor is it always possible to try levelling it. 
At this concluding point, I shall cite Alan Tan, my ex-professor of air law 
from the National University of Singapore who once said that states are sim-
ply not born equal – some have superior geography, others have a big popu-
lation base for their airlines to benefit from, and through the decades, it was 
the successful, well-run airlines from small, strategically-located countries that 
have maximized those advantages, often in tandem with a government willing 
to provide airport hub infrastructure and other incentives. KLM, Singapore 
Airlines, Korean Air, Emirates, Qatar Airways, Ethiopian Airlines and Copa 
are good examples. These sixth-freedom carriers were able to maximize (some 
might say exploit) their advantages to collect and funnel passenger “feed” from 
other countries through their well-located and efficient hubs. The success of 
this strategy depends largely on geography, of course, but also generous or 
unlimited third-and-fourth freedom rights exchanged with other countries. 
As previously mentioned, “fair and equal opportunity” is a familiar concept 
in bilateral air services agreements, but it has not been sufficiently tested un-
der the traditional, uncompetitive, international air transport system. Howe-
ver, increasing liberalization and competition requires that airlines should be 
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able to compete under fair competitive conditions, although this is easier said 
than done. 
There is no doubt that the hot potato in international aviation is currently 
the ongoing state aid issue. Rightly, given the competitive distortions it can 
cause, however, rules appropriate on an international basis are not easy to 
agree on. In the European Union during the 1990s airlines were allowed to 
receive substantial state aid, principally in order to help them restructure to 
meet the new competitive environment, although a much stricter approach is 
now taken. A strict approach may not be appropriate for airlines in other parts 
of the world, at different stages of need or development. For example, the US 
was a stern critic of EU practice during the 1990s, but took a different view to 
requests by its airlines for aid post 9/11 – and the EU then became the critic.
The existing diversity in national, institutional and economic arrangements 
already underlines that the international playing field is not level. Despite 
these inevitable differences, substantial efforts have been undertaken in the 
context of ICAO to harmonize safety, security and economic regulation in 
the global airline industry. However, differences among states with regard to 
fiscal policy, labor policy and bankruptcy conditions will have an ongoing im-
pact on competitive conditions in the international airline industry. The more 
liberalization stimulates competition in international air transport, the more 
important it is for airlines to have fair and equal opportunity to compete. But, 
as said, this is not easy. However, the effort must be made if competition is 
ultimately to be sustainable. 
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LET PO RUBU ZAKONITOSTI – OČUVANJE PRAVEDNOG 
TRŽIŠNOG NATJECANJA U EUROPSKOM I MEĀUNARODNOM 
ZRAKOPLOVSTVU
Pravila tržišnog natjecanja među zrakoplovnim tvrtkama ne postoje na međunarodnoj 
razini. Pošteno tržišno natjecanje poseban je izazov kada se zrakoplovne tvrtke moraju 
prilagoditi potpuno drukčijim regulatornim, pravnim i društvenim okvirima. Sporazumi 
o zračnom prometu čine jedini pravni okvir za pošteno tržišno natjecanje. Kako bi 
očuvale konkurentnost svojih nacionalnih zrakoplovnih tvrtki na liberaliziranom tržištu, 
neke vlade dolaze u iskušenje pomoći svojim nacionalnim zrakoplovnim tvrtkama na 
načine koji drugim tvrtkama onemogućuju pošteno i ravnopravno tržišno natjecanje. 
Tijekom proteklih mjeseci svjedočili smo ozbiljnim optužbama da su tvrtke Qatar 
Airways, Etihad Airways i Emirates Airline, tri velike bliskoistočne zrakoplovne tvrtke 
u vlasništvu vlada Katara, odnosno Ujedinjenih Arapskih Emirata, od 2004. primile 
pozamašne subvencije. Zbog tih subvencija tvrtkama iz Europske unije, koje takve 
subvencije ne primaju, otežano je tržišno natjecanje, a njima se i narušava pravedni 
duh sporazuma o zračnom prometu i međunarodno tržište zrakoplovnih usluga te im se 
jednostavno osigurava nepravedna prednost. 
Sve veći trgovački utjecaj neeuropskih prijevoznika (posebno onih s Bliskog istoka) 
izazvao je ozbiljnu zabrinutost u Europskoj uniji zbog utjecaja na etablirane prijevoznike 
i njihovo poslovanje te je ponukao na uvođenje oštrije regulative kako bi se osigurala 
ravnopravnost tržišnog natjecanja. Uočeni problemi ne odnose se samo na neskriveno 
subvencioniranje i državne potpore zrakoplovnim tvrtkama već i na jeftiniji pristup 
aerodromskoj infrastrukturi, gorivu i kapitalu te pretjerano korištenje prava šeste slobode 
i općenito labavo radno zakonodavstvo. 
Unatoč relativno snažnom međunarodnom zakonodavnom okviru radni uvjeti u nekim 
tvrtkama i dalje su loši, a prava radnika uporno se krše usprkos mnogim konvencijama 
i zakonima koji uređuju tržište rada. Postoje ozbiljne indicije da se na nekim rastućim 
tržištima zrakoplovnih usluga radnopravni standardi ne primjenjuju u potpunosti. 
Kako bi se zaustavio trend koji se kreće prema nepravednom tržišnom natjecanju, 
potrebne su konkretne mjere koje će osigurati ravnopravne uvjete na tržištu za sve 
međunarodne i europske operatere koji posluju na europskim aerodromima. Uredba (EZ) 
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868/2004 pokazala se nepraktičnom i teško primijenjivom te je potreban novi pravni 
instrument koji će zaštititi europske interese od takvog nepravednog postupanja. 
U ovome izlaganju istražit ćemo mogućnosti za rješavanje tog problema i očuvanje 
načela pravednog tržišnog natjecanja. Jedno od temeljnih pitanja kojima ćemo se baviti 
jest ono odabira najprikladnijeg alata za bavljenje tim problemom. U tome smislu, uzet 
ćemo u obzir mogućnost izmjene trenutačne Uredbe ili usvajanja nove, koja će zamijeniti 
Uredbu (EZ) 868/2004, te predložiti regulatorno uređenje u obliku ogledne odredbe 
u sporazumima o zračnom prometu koje bi države članice Europske unije rabile kao 
dodatno sredstvo detekcije, prevencije i uklanjanja zlouporaba koje narušavaju tržišno 
natjecanje. Dok se te odredbe ne počnu primjenjivati i sve dok se strane tvrtke ne počnu 
pridržavati transparentnih financijskih i računovodstvenih načela i isključe državne 
potpore i subvencije, njihova prava prometovanja u EU-u trebalo bi ograničiti.
Ključne riječi: pošteno tržišno natjecanje, “Middle-Eastern 3”, subvencije, nepravedne 
povlastice, Uredba (EZ) 868/2004
